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FAMILY LAW- LETTING GO AND STOPPING
THE CONTINUOUS CYCLE OF LITIGATION:
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
AFFIRMS SCOPE OF JUDICIAL AND LIMITED
NON-BINDING PARENT COORDINATOR
AUTHORITY IN CUSTODY CASES OF MINOR
CHILDREN-BOWER V. BOURNAY-BOWER,
15 N.E.3D 745 (MASS. 2014).
To protect all litigants' access to justice, the Massachusetts
Constitution provides that an individual has the right to seek recourse for
all injuries or wrongs to persons, property, or character. 1 In domestic
relation cases, recent trends have shown that parties tend to unanimously
agree to alternative dispute resolutions ("ADR") rather than enduring
protracted and expensive litigation.2 By preserving the legislative intent set
forth in these provisions, all parties must agree to utilize a third-party
mediator who possesses decision-binding authority, instead of completing

1 See

MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XI. (providing right to remedy for wrongs). Article 11 of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states in full:
Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having
recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in person,
property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being
obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without
delay; comfortably to the laws.
Id.
2 See Elizabeth F. Beyer, A Pragmatic Look at Mediation and Collaborative Law as
Alternatives to Family Law Litigation, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 303, 309 n.23 (2008) (citing Marc

Galanter & Mia Cahill, "MAost Cases Settle ": JudicialPromotion andRegulation Settlements, 46
1339, 1340 (1994)) (recognizing that 85% to 95% of family law cases mostly
settle by using arbitration); see also Preparing for Family Mediation, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 2 (2012),
https ://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/dispute resolution/Mediation Guide Fami
ly.pdf (reaffirming mediation normally produces long-lasting solution using collaborative
problem solving). See generally John Lande, The Movement Toward Early Case Handling in
Courts and Private Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 81, 84 (2008) (stating
most cases settle without trial through alternative means); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:
An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/courses.judpol.Galanter.pdf
(tracking steady increase in alternative dispute resolution methods replacing trial hearings).
STAN. L. REv.
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the full course of a case. 34 In Bower v. Bournay-Bower,4 the Supreme

Judicial Court ("SJC") considered whether a judge has the inherent judicial
authority in appointing a parent coordinator to make binding agreements
regarding child custody without unanimous consent of both parties.5 After
considering the operational boundaries of probate and family courts, the
SJC held that the judge exceeded her inherent judicial authority in
appointing a parent coordinator without the approval of both parties,
thereby limiting the use of this essential tool and failing to recognize the
issues plaguing the probate and family courts caused by overflowing
dockets.
Additionally, this ruling opens the opportunity for creating
standards for future litigation regarding the scope of authority, which will
also be discussed in this case comment.
Michelle A. Bournay-Bower ("Boumay-Bower") and William J.
Bower ("Bower"), parents of four minor children, filed for divorce in
March of 2009 after nineteen years of marriage.' Following more than two
years of litigation, a judgment for divorce nisi was entered, which included
stipulations for shared legal custody of the parties' children. 9 When
judgment for divorce was entered in 2011, each party filed crosscomplaints for contempt alleging that the other failed to comply with terms
set forth in the parenting plan. 0 Bower's complaint requested BoumayBower submit to parent coordination and be bound by the parent

3 See Brief of Appellant at 13-14, Bower v. Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d 745 (Mass. 2014)
(No. SJC- 11478) (agreeing use of parent coordinators permissible through unanimous consent).
4 15 N.E.3d 745 (Mass. 2014).
5 Id. at 745.
6 Id. at 752-53; see Probate and Family Court Department Annual Report Statistics,
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE PROBATE AND FAMILY COURT (2015) [hereinafter Probateand

Family Court DepartmentAnnual Report Statistics] http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/courts-andjudges/courts/probate-and-family-court/summarystats20l5.pdf (last visited February 8, 2016)
(tracking divorces filed in Massachusetts in 2015).
7 See In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 717-19 (1982) (citing flexibility of judges in probate and
family courts to protect best interests of parties).
8 See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 747 (indicating parties, initial start of divorce
proceedings); see also Brief for Appellee William J. Bower at 5, Bower v. Bournay-Bower, 15
N.E.3d 745 (Mass. 2014) (No. SJC- 11478) (finalizing divorce in May 2011).
9 See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 747 (detailing judgment of joint legal custody over
minors). The parenting plan detailed holiday schedules and daily custody routines relating to the
cooperation, consultation, and communication between the parties. Brief for Appellee, supra
note 8, at 5.
10 See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 747 (detailing facts of underlying case); Brief for
Appellee, supra note 8, at 5 (detailing parties' complaints for contempt). Bower alleged that
Bournay-Bower failed to consult him seventeen times on major matters involving the children,

whereas Bournay-Bower alleged Bower failed to communicate with her about issues relating to
their children's health and well-being four times. Brief for Appellee, supra note 8, at 6.
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coordinator's decisions.11 The judge allowed Bower's motion, over
Bournay-Bower's
objection, and ordered the parties to submit to binding
12
mediation.
After the appointment of the parent coordinator, the initial judge
who presided over this matter retired and the ongoing case was reassigned
to another judge. 3 On February 6, 2012, Bower filed complaints for
contempt against Bournay-Bower alleging that she failed to comply with
the Parent Coordinator's Agreement, as ordered by the first judge.1 4 Upon
reviewing the circumstances of the case, the succeeding judge adhered to
the retired judge's decision with regards to binding mandatory alternate
dispute resolution to resolve parenting time and custody issues.1 5 In
response, Bournay-Bower challenged the judge's decision arguing it was
outside the scope of judicial authority.16 The SJC transferred this case sua
sponte, and ultimately concluded that the judge surpassed her inherent

11See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 747 (stating Bower sought binding mandatory
alternative dispute resolution). The judge declined to hear the contempt complaints and instead,
she focused on appointing a parent coordinator and vesting her with binding authority. ILd.
The
judge explained that she wanted to try to get "a system in effect" and "get out of this cycle where
you gather up a bunch of stuff, you come in like a volcano overflowing, and all the bad stuff has
actually already happened, and I can't get a handle on how it happened." Brief for Appellee,
supra note 8, at 9-10.
12 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 8, at 6 (granting authority to parent coordinator after
both sides argued vigorously regarding parent schedule). The judge made it clear that the parties
must follow the parent coordinator's decisions on matters of custody and visitation "as if they
were court orders." Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 748. In rendering this decision, Judge Harms
believed it was more effective to appoint a parent coordinator, "before ... [he spends] seven
hours listening to 17,000 complaints." Brief for Appellee, supra note 8, at 8.
13 See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 748 (explaining transition of judges during the case).
14 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 8, at 4 (arguing that Bournay-Bower did
not comply with
agreement established by parent coordinator).
15 See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 748 (reaffirming parent coordinator's binding authority
given by previous judge); see also Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 8-9 (outlining parent
coordinator's authority). The judge's Clarified Order specified that the Parent Coordinator has
binding authority to issue rulings, but if either party was unsatisfied by the rulings, the unsatisfied
party could obtain a contrary order from the court in the time between the Parent Coordinator's
decision and when the decision was to be in effect. See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 748
(explaining scope of parent coordinator).
16 See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 751 (describing Bournay-Bower's argument
for refusing
binding parent coordinator's binding decisions). Bournay-Bower contested the judge's decision
on grounds statute of court rule that exists making it permissible to compel a party to adhere to
decisions of a parent coordinator absent agreement of both parties. Id. Conversely, Bowers
asserted that parent coordinators are commonly utilized in Massachusetts Probate and Family
Courts, and therefore, the judge's discretion was proper because there was no statute that
prohibited such action. Id. The judge issued a Clarified Order as final judgment, however,
within it, she acknowledged Bournay-Bower's right to appeal her authority. Brief of Appellant,
supra note 3, at 9-10.
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1
authority, thus making it an unlawful delegation of her judicial authority. 7
The SJC vacated the order of granting the parent coordinator binding
authority and any subsequent orders that are determined by parent
coordinators without consent of both parties shall have no effect.18
With divorce becoming increasingly common in the United States,
ADR is being utilized with increased frequency in family law cases in
order to preserve limited judicial resources and unburden back-logged
courts. 19 Modern American family dynamics of recent years pushed this
particular ADR phenomenon into focus, forcing the judicial system to turn
to ADR services to preserve an over-extended court system's resources. 20

17

See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 748 (determining order was so broad in scope, thus

constituting unlawful delegation of judge's inherent authority).
is See id. (vacating order appointing parent coordinator as well as subsequent judgment).
The SJC ruled that the inherent powers of the Commonwealth have particular boundaries that
must align with the individual right to the "impartial interpretation of laws and administration of
justice." Id. at 753 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXIX). The SJC believes that judicial
powers should not be exercised in a manner that undermines constitutional rights. Id. at 748.
19 See Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage:Could We? Should We?, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
279, 283-88 (2008) (explaining no-fault divorce, immaturity, social norms attributing to United
States' high divorce rate). Throughout the past several years, Massachusetts has experienced a
staggering influx of divorce cases filed, as well as other family law matters. See Probate and
Family Court Department Annual Report Statistics, supra note 6 (detailing amount of divorce
cases filed). In 2004, there were 19,764 divorces and by 2015, there were 23,954 filings. Id.;
Probate and Family Court Department Annual Report Statistics Fiscal Year Ending 2004,
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE PROBATE AND FAMILY COURT (2004),
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/courts -and-judges/courts/probate-and- family-court/stats2004combined.pdf; see Loebel v. Loebel, 933 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (describing
how judge adopts GAL's suggestions to appoint parent coordinator for mediations between
parents); R.S. v. M.P., 894 N.E.2d 634, 636 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (using mediation for custody
issues); D.C. v. J.S., 790 N.E.2d 686, 689 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (emphasizing judge's belief that
mediation was indispensable to managing split family). Jurisdictions outside of Massachusetts
have also put an emphasis on appointing neutral third parties to resolve family and probate
matters. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 638 (2016) (establishing judge's ability to appoint referees
when parties agree); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-128.1(2015) (promulgating courts can appoint
parenting coordinator if in children's best interest, regardless of parent consent); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 9:358.1-358.9 (2015) (allowing court to appoint parent coordinator); MINN. STAT. § 518.1751
(2015) (permitting court to appoint parenting time expeditor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-91 (2015)
(establishing court may appoint parenting coordinator during child custody actions); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 43, § 120.3 (2015) (allowing court to appoint parenting coordinator on its own motion); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-63 (2015) (granting court's ability to appoint parenting coordinators to
assist in resolving contentious issues); TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 153.0071 (2015) (permitting court to
refer suit to arbitration under certain circumstances); see also Jordan v. Jordan, 14 A.3d 1136,
1153 n.14 (D.C. 2011) (referencing thirty jurisdictions in twenty-seven states using statutes or
court rules in appointing coordinators).
20 See Nancy Ver Steegh, Family Court Reform and ADR: Shifting Values and Expectations
Transform the Divorce Process, 42 FAM. L. Q. 659, 659-61 (2008) (explaining how overextended
and declining court resources encourages ADR services in child custody proceedings); see also
Bar Association of Norfolk County Programsfor 2015/2016: Conciliation Program of the Bar
Association of Norfolk County, NORFOLK BAR ASSOCIATION,
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The numerous family law and domestic relation matters have created court
congestion and has led to increased usage of ADR methods.21 Courts favor
ADR because they are experiencing a substantial increase in the number of
pro se parties. 22 Moreover, courts recognize that using ADR methods aids
litigants in arriving at solutions more efficiently while protecting the best
interests of the parties' children by decreasing stressful, high-conflict
litigation during a child's formative years where they are most at risk for
experiencing resounding traumatic harm to their well-being. 23
The
reverberating effects of constant, high-conflict litigation effects children
long after their formative years of development, and can stress the nuances
of parent-child relationships. 24

http://www.norfolkbarassn.org/programs/ (last visited February 8, 2016) (detailing conciliation
program in ADR aimed at combatting court congestion by pro se litigants).
21 See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. ET AL., 2 MASS. PRACTICE, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 42:4 Appointment of Parent Coordinators, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2015) (discussing
alternative avenues for resolution in over-crowded family and probate courts).
22 See id. (discussing policy reasons for appointing parent coordinators
in divorce
proceedings). Due to budget cuts, the number of law clerks has been significantly reduced,
hurting the ability of judges to research and prepare decisions and findings in a timely manner.
See Dan Ring, Massachusetts Courts in Crisis Thanks to Recent Budget Cuts, Top Judges Say,
MASSLIVE (Apr. 12, 2012, 9:33 PM),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2012/04/top massachusetts judges said.html
(detailing effects of budget cuts on family court resources. Consequently, Paula M. Carey, Chief
Justice of the Probate and Family Court, believes "budges] really can't deliver justice the way it
should be." Ild.
23 See Dana E. Prescott, When Co-ParentingFalters: ParentingCoordinators, Parents-InConflict, and the Delegation of Judicial Authority, 20 ME. BAR.J. 240, 241 (2005) (explaining
progressive trends for using parent coordinators). Generally, there are four driving factors that
pressure the court into utilizing parent coordinators. Id. First, economic costs of divorce and
family dislocation drive the rates of private civil litigation and force parties to court. ld. Second,
chronic conflict between parents places their children at risk for resounding traumatic emotional,
economic, academic, physical, and psychological harm to their well-being. ld. Third, family and
probate courts are overwhelmed, and lack the immediate resources necessary to protect a child's
best interest during divorce proceedings. ld. Finally, parent coordinating helps minimize conflict
and promote parental cooperation, which cuts the costs on re-litigation rates. Id.; see Elizabeth
Kruse, ADR, Technology, and New Court Rules
Family Law Trends for the Twenty-First
Century, 21. J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 207, 216 (2008) ("According to AFCC Task Force on
Parenting Coordination, the essential purpose of parenting coordination, 'is a child-focused
alternative dispute resolution process in which a mental health or legal professional with
mediation training and experience assists high-conflict parents to implement their parenting plan
by facilitating the resolution of their disputes in a timely manner.
). Seventy-five percent of
children experience divorce by age three, and more than half by age six. Kruse, supra, at 215-16.
Chronic, high-conflict litigation between disputing parents presents a strong probability of longterm negative effects on the children like depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder.
Id. at 216.
24 See Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for Parents and Children in
Custody and Access Disputes: Current Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129,
139 (2002) (comparing parent-child relationships between litigation with mediation methods). A
study found divorced and separated parents who use mediation to resolve parenting disputes were
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Recognizing the increasing popularity and positive results from
using parent coordinators, some states set specified parameters defining
their role as "quasi-judicial officers. 25 Typically, a parent coordinator
assists litigants in reaching resolutions for disagreements pertaining to
decisions involving children, such as their child's education, activities, and
discipline. 26 The parent coordinator's main goal is to facilitate decisionmaking, which helps families avoid going through the emotional and
lengthy process of the adversarial court system, so that the children's lives
can proceed as seamlessly and conflict-free as possible.2 Furthermore, by
using parent coordinators, judges have an efficient and effective alternative
to handle contentious cases that also saves litigants from paying legal fees
many can ill afford.2 8
Despite the increasing use of parent coordinators in family law
proceedings, Massachusetts lacks a statute or a court rule recognizing the
29
role-and boundaries-of a parent coordinator in the courtroom.

more involved with their children twelve years after the high-conflict disputes compared to
parents who litigated their grievances regarding their children. Id.
25 See AFCC Task Force on Parenting Coordination, Special Issue: Child Protection in the
21st Century: Special Report: ParentingCoordination:Implementation Issues, 41 FAM. CT. REV.
533, 557-58 (2003) (determining Massachusetts parent coordinators to be "quasi-judicial
officers"). Proposed legislation delegates parent coordinators as quasi-judicial officers, "with
continuing authority to act during the designated term of service." Id.at 558. Although
legislation is pending, enough Massachusetts cases involving parent coordinators encouraged this
official, broader, and authoritative title. Id.
26 See id. at 543-45 (explaining issues parent coordinator is can assist in resolving); see
also
Katzman v. Healy, 933 N.E.2d 156, 160 (2010) (acknowledging unexpected events, like health
emergencies, should be incorporated into parent agreements). Parenthood is not neatly divided
into clean-cut sleeping, waking, and school categories, and parent agreements should allow room
for fluidity in unplanned occurrences. AFCC Task Force on Parenting Coordination, supra note
25, at 543-45. ADR promotes parental cooperation in the face of unexpected events and
emergencies that can be nearly impossible to address by going through the adversarial system of
family court. See id.
at n.6 (agreeing that parent coordinator would be appropriate resource when
considering modifying custody).
27 See PHILIP M. STAHL, CONDUCTING CUSTODY EVALUATIONS: FROM BASIC TO COMPLEX
ISSUES 160 (Kassie Graves et. al. eds., 2011) (elaborating on parent coordinator's major
objectives). Parent coordinators strive to unclog congested court dockets from high-conflict
families by focusing on seeking resolutions in a timely manner. Ild.More importantly, parent
coordinators assist families in resolving their differences more quickly, thus allowing children to
manage the nuances of their evolving family dynamic and transition successfully. Id.
28 See Ver Steegh, supra note 20, at 671 (detailing high fees for litigation procedures); see
also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
for Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 971-73 (1979) (detailing transaction cost of divorce). Calculating
legal fees in family law proceedings is difficult to measure because in divorce, costs generally
tend to be higher when minors are involved, due to the fact that the parties and court must
consider the additional intense emotional allocation issues associated with custody proceedings.
See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra at 972-73 (discussing costs associated with divorces).
29 See MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:18 (governing rules for court-connected dispute resolution
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Nevertheless, Massachusetts routinely recognizes their role, and uses this
method accordingly, making use of parent coordinators in Massachusetts's
family courts increasingly common. 0 Rather than increasing conflict by
constantly going through the adversarial system, parent coordinators have
the potential to decrease the conflict that arises in family court because they
are able to expedite the process of arriving at a workable agreement
between both parties.3 1 Since Massachusetts does not have a definitive set
of statutes, governing laws, or court rules addressing the role of parent
coordinators, the Commonwealth uses other jurisdictions' viewpoints and
definitions of parent coordinators to help with determining their roles and
expectations .32
In Bower v. Bournay-Bower, the SJC considered whether granting
a court appointed parent coordinator with binding authority absent a
unanimous agreement from both parties was within the judge's judicial

services). Rule 1:18 sets forth a comprehensive scheme for ADR services, but does not define the
boundaries or maximum authority parent coordinators have in family and probate court issues.
See id.
at 6(d) (permitting any Trial Court authority to mandate dispute resolution in civil cases).
30 See Healy, 933 N.E.2d at 159 (illustrating how judge accepted guardian's scheduling
recommendation to judge); Lobel v. Lobel, 933 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010)
(suggesting use of parent coordinator regarding custody decisions related to child permitted);
Tammaro v. O'Brien, 921 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (determining parent
coordination needed in addressing separation agreement); R.S. v. M.P., 894 N.E.2d 634, 638 n.8
(Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (appointing parent coordinators provides convenient and efficient decision
making resolutions); see also Andrea R. Barter, Commonwealth looks to legitimize roles of parent
coordinators who strive to help divorcing families, MASS. LAW J., Nov. 2003,
http://www.massbar.org/publications/lawyers-journal/2003/november/commonwealth-looks-tolegitimize-roles (finding families who agree to parent coordination increases favorable outcomes).
Multiple ADR services are not effective enough to alleviate issues arising from high-conflict
divorce. Barter, supra. However, parent coordination serves as an alternative to end "the
revolving door of litigation." Id.
31 See Barter, supra note 30 (using parent coordinators promotes workable agreements
between parties instead of extended litigation).
32 See generally Jordan v. Jordan, 14 A.3d 1136, 1153 (D.C. 2011) (naming thirty
jurisdictions that appoint parent coordinators through statute or court rule). Other jurisdictions
make the role of a parent coordinator a hybrid of mediation and arbitration. Id. at 1153. If
resolution is futile, the parent coordinator has authority to issue a binding decision. ld. See
generally MINN. STAT. § 518.1751(lb)(c) (2001) ("a neutral person [is] authorized to use a
mediation-arbitration process to resolve parenting time disputes [and the] parenting time
expeditor shall [make a decision] resolv[ing] [the] dispute"); ARIZ. FAM. L. PROC. R. 74(B)
(2015) ("The court may appoint a third party as a parenting coordinator.., only if each parent
has agreed to the appointment . . .the parents agree to be bound by the decisions made by the
parenting coordinator."). Compare FLA. STAT. § 61.125(1) (2015) (binding decisions must be
limited within the scope of the court's order), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-92(b) (2013) ("the court
may authorize a parenting coordinator to decide issues regarding the implementation of the
parenting plan that are not specifically governed by the court order and which the parties are
unable to resolve. The parties must comply with the parenting coordinator's decision until the
court reviews the decision.").
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scope of authority.33 The SJC examined the breadth of judicial decisionmaking authority and determined that the powers vested within those
appointed are vital to maintaining an effective and efficient judicial
system.3 4 In effect, the Massachusetts legislature vested the Probate and
Family Courts with exclusive jurisdiction to decide contested issues
concerning the care, custody, and maintenance of minor children in divorce
actions.3 5
In confronting emotional and difficult issues, such as custody,
judges must keep the best interests of the children at the forefront of their
decision.36 Addressing such sensitive issues provides family and probate
judges with an inherent authority to refer parties to parent coordinators
when dealing with issues pertaining to minor children.
Based on the
parties' long history demonstrating their inability to parent cooperatively,
the judge appointed a parent coordinator to make binding decisions
regarding their custody issues, but the SJC held that doing so

33 See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 751 (detailing Boumay-Bower's challenge of
judge's

Clarified Order without unanimous agreement from both parties).
34 See Brief for Amici Curiae Massachusetts Law Review Institute, Community Legal
Services and Counseling Center, Greater Boston Legal Services, Harvard Legal Aid Bureau,
Justice Center of Southeast Massachusetts, Metrowest Legal Services & The Second Step at 10,
Bower v. Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d 745 (2014) (No. SJC-11478) [hereinafter Brief for Amici
Curiae], available at http://masscases.com/briefs/sjc/469/469mass690/SJC11478 05 Amicus MA Law Reform Brief.pdf ("To ensure fairness when people avail
themselves of [the court's 'awesome powers over the life, liberty and property of every citizen'],
the court system maintains robust procedural safeguards, and judges are selected by a process that
involves careful scrutiny of qualifications and temperament."). The court system's judicial
function is fundamental to the Government's structure. Id.;
see Superintendent of Belchertown
State Sch. v. Saikewicz 370 N.E.2d 417, 433 (2008) (appointing guardian ad litem to protect best
interests of persons within powers of probate court). But see Standing Order 1-06: Case
Management and Time Standards for Cases Filed in the Probate and Family Court Department
(2006) [hereinafter Standing Order 1-06], available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/ case-legalres-/rules-of-court/probate/pfc-orders/1-06.html (encouraging parties to reach agreement during
pre-trial).
35 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 215, § 2-6 (stating family court's jurisdictional boundaries
concerning child's care, custody, and maintenance). A reason why Massachusetts probate and
family courts are so overworked and congested is because they handle increasingly complex cases
and have jurisdiction over all domestic relation matters. See Barbara A. Babb, Special Issue:
Unified Family Court: Reevaluating Where We Stand: A Comprehensive Survey of America's
Family Justice Systems, 46 FAM. CT.REv. 230, 232-33 (2008) (noting different forms of family
court in United States).
36 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (highlighting negative effects on
minor
children caused by high-conflict disputes); see also Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (Mass.
2003) (considering best interests of child in weighing decision to grant sole custody to mother);
Custody of Kali, 792 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Mass. 2003) (considering parental roles when deciding
best interest of child).
37 See In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 717-19 (1982) (citing flexibility of judges in probate and
family courts to protect best interests of parties).
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impermissibly passed the core of "binding decision-making authority" to a
third party when that authority must remain solely with the court.38
In this instant case, the SJC found that appointing a parent
coordinator and making the coordinator's decision binding was not
appropriate because both parties did not agree to be bound by the parent
coordinator's decisions and treat the decisions as if they were court
orders.3 9 The SJC believed that compelling Bournay-Bower to submit to a
parent coordinator's binding decision violated Article 29 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and the right to seek recourse as
provided by Article 11. 4 0 Ignoring Bournay-Bower's right to seek recourse
under the law, and instead compelling her to submit to binding-decisions of
a parent coordinator rather than a judge, made the appointment of a parent
coordinator unconstitutional. 41
The SJC highlights that judges have
authority and obligation to make a decision, rather than passing off that
judgment to a third-party individual.4 2

38

See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 754 (binding parties to parent coordinator authority does

not fall within judge's inherent authority); see also Gustin v. Gustin, 652 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Mass.
1995) (prohibiting judge from compelling parties to submit to binding arbitration without mutual
consent). But see Eccleston v. Bankosky, 780 N.E.2d 1266, 1275 (Mass. 2003) (providing for
equitable relief for a vulnerable class); sources cited supra note 20 (explaining benefits of ADR in
probate and family court). Tailoring probate and family court's flexible inherent powers is
appropriate when the interests of justice are served to protect vulnerable children who are
involved in parties' disputes. Eccleston, 780 N.E.2d at 1275. But see Brief for Appellee, supra
note 8, at 23 (clarifying Judge's intentions of parent coordinator authority). The Judge did not
intentionally forfeit her delegation duties, but rather appointed a parent coordinator in hopes to
offer the parties an expeditious process, in contrast to the lengthy court proceedings. See Brief
for Appellee, supra note 8, at 16 (explaining Judge Harms reason for appointing a parent
coordinator). The Judge hoped that a parent coordinator could serve as a positive coach for the
parties and settle their disputes before going to court because, "if it's not big enough to fight
about, then you let it go." ld. (internal quotations omitted).
39 See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 748 (explaining holding regarding both parent's
consent).
40 See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 753 (2014) (explaining rights evoked by judge's order
to submit to parent coordinator's decisions); see also MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 29 ("It is essential
to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his life, liberty, property, and character, that
there be an impartial interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice. If is the right of
every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will
admit.").
41 See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XI (protecting citizen's due process rights, providing recourse
for injuries to or wrongs to persons). But see Jordan v. Jordan, 14 A.3d 1136, 1160 (D.C. 2011)
(holding parent coordinator decisions do not violate parent's due process rights). The procedural
due process requirement is flexible and adapts to the particular issues at hand. Jordan, 14 A.3d at
1159. A parent coordinator only exercises power in limited capacity during day-to-day disputes
because they require immediate resolution, which one cannot receive in court proceedings. Id.
42 See Gustin v. Gustin, 652 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Mass. 1995) (recognizing judges do not have
power to compel parties to binding arbitration); see also Gill v. DiGiovanni, 612 N.E.2d 1205,
1206 (Mass. 1993) (binding separation agreement gives no right to compel or elect arbitration);
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Probate and family judges utilize their flexible, inherent authority
to appoint parent coordinators under appropriate circumstances; therefore,
the SJC's reasoning fails to recognize the realities plaguing the probate and
family courts as it limits the judges' abilities to conserve the court's
declining resources and lengthens the times it takes to resolve cases
efficiently to allow for families to heal.43
Instead of appropriately
acknowledging the progressive trends of family and probate courts' use of
ADR methods, the SJC concluded that in order to act in the best interests of
persons involved, appointing a parent coordinator and allowing their
decisions to be binding was unlawful because there was not unanimous
consent; however , this is problematic because the contentious nature of
family law matters can cloud the better judgment of the parties, making
44
unanimous consent unachievable in many cases.
Although parties to domestic relations action possess the ability to
exercise their constitutional right to be offered a fair hearing before the
court, this decision fails to consider the interests of all persons involved,
namely, the children.4 5 Chronic conflict between parents places the
children, who are essentially the center of the issue and most effected, at

Julia Reischel, 'Parent coordinators' Unique form of post-divorce ADR embraced by some,
denounced by others, MASS. LAW. WKLY., June 1, 2009,
http://www.masslawyersweekly.com/2009/06/01/8216parent-coordinators/
(suggesting parent
coordinator's inappropriate authority in family court). But see Kimberly C. Emery & Robert E.
Emery, Who Knows What is Best for Children? Honoring Agreements and Contracts Between
Parties Who Live Apart, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 172 (2014) (noting judges have
authority to rule in best interest of parties' children); Matthew J. Sullivan, Parenting
Coordination: Coming of Age?, 51 FAM. CT. REv. 56, 56 (2013) (pointing out benefits, like
efficiency, when using ADR methods).
43 See Ver Steegh, supra note 20, at 669-70 (emphasizing importance of ADR methods
to
preserve overextended probate and family courts); see also D.C. v. J.S., 790 N.E.2d 686, 689
(Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (relaying trial judge's emphasis on mediation). Parent coordinators
alleviate the already over-crowded family and probate court system by providing effective and
efficient resolutions regarding the welfare of minors. See Sullivan, supra note 42, at 58-60
(describing role of parenting coordinators).
44 See Bournay-Bower, 15 N.E.3d at 754 (determining unlawful delegation of judicial
authority violated Bournay-Bower's best interests); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text
(suggesting authoritative powers given to parent coordinator was so broad in scope, it was
unlawful). But see Ver Steegh, supra note 20, at 669-70 (using ADR services allows for efficient
resolutions in custody disputes).
45

See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. ET AL., 2 MASS. PRACTICE, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 43:4 Obtaining Records, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2015) (discussing release forms for
confidential information). Inherent judicial authority permits the judge to determine whether a
coordinator is beneficial in solving a dispute rather than waiting. Id. In most cases, several
months or years pass before the issue is brought to the judge again at trial. Id.; see supra notes
23-24 and accompanying text (using ADR methods over litigation helps emotional stability of
minor children).
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risk for painful, lasting psychological and emotional trauma.46 Thus, tools
given to judges, such as ADR, are essential to finding quick resolutions to
prolonged family conflict. This decision took away an essential tool from
probate and family courts, which cannot be said to be serving best interests
of the children.48
In an ideal judicial system, family and probate courts would have
the proper resources to listen to all issues in a timely manner, yet the reality
is that the system is overwhelmed; it lacks the immediate resources
necessary to protect a child's best interest, therefore making parent
coordinators essential in domestic relations issues. 4 9 Going forward, the
future of family litigation should not be limited in providing problemsolving solutions, but permit flexibility in allocating authority, just as the
judge did in this case>. Judge selection is a rigorous process involving
careful scrutiny, and we should trust that their rulings consider the best
interests of all persons they are expected to serve. 5' To ensure fairness
when people avail themselves of the judge's flexible inherent powers, the
SJC should reconsider prohibiting all probate and family courts from
46 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (applying ADR as safeguard for child's wellbeing). Often, disputing parents view custody as an all-or-nothing matter, seeing one as the
"winner" and the other the "loser".
STAHL, supra note 27 at 145. This mindset reinforces
splitting and competition of custody. Id.
47 See Barter, supra note 30 (finding families agreeing to parent coordination increases
favorable outcomes). Multiple ADR services are not effective enough to alleviate issues arising
from high-conflict divorce. Id. However, parent coordination serves as an alternative to end "the
revolving door of litigation." Id. Rather than increasing conflict, parent coordinators have the
potential to decrease the conflict that arises in family court. Id.; see Emery, supra note 42, at 172
(noting judges have authority to rule in best interest in of parties' children); Prescott, supra note
23, at 243-44 (explaining progressive trends for using parent coordinators). Chronic conflict
between parents places their children at risk for resounding traumatic emotional, economic,
academic, physical, and psychological harm to their well-being. Prescott, supra note 23, at 241.
48 See Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (N.J. 1976) (accepting court's flexible powers
when dealing in the bests interest of persons in their jurisdiction); see also Brief for Appellee,
supra note 8, at 15 (exercising careful creativity needed when handling highly charged emotions).
49 See Prescott, supra note 23, at 241-43 (describing pressures that lead to essential use of
parent coordinators in divorce proceedings); Ver Steegh, supra note 20, at 669-70 (declining
court resources encourages greater use of ADR services in child custody proceedings). Pro se
parties encounter several problems without proper guidance, and thus create backlog in the court
system, and unnecessary extended litigation. Ver Steegh, supra note 20, at 669-70.
50 See Matter of Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 717-19 (1982) (citing flexibility of judges in probate
and family courts to protect best interests of parties). Issues in the probate and family courts
should allocate a more creative and flexible use of powers, because just like every family, no one
case is the same. See id. at 719 (providing court has flexibility to provide whatever remedy is
needed for a particular case). When dealing with matters concerning a person, the court "is not
limited by any narrow bounds, but it is empowered to stretch forth its arm in whatever direction
its aid and protection may be needed[.]" ld.
51 See Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 34, at 10 (emphasizing careful selection of judges
rigorous judge selection involving careful scrutiny).
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allowing a parent coordinator's decision to be binding, even without
unanimous consent, because there are several instances where parties do
not want to cooperate, even when it is better for them to do so.52 Since
probate and family judges keep cases before them, they are familiar with
the parties that continuously reappear in their chambers>. With this unique
relationship established, probate and family judges should be allowed to
exercise their inherent judicial authority in determining when parties should
use ADR because it would result in a more effective
and efficient way to
S
•
54
resolve disputes rather than continuing litigation.' By doing so, the court
system is not overwhelmed, and the parties as well as the children are not
subjected to months or years of litigation in resource-strapped courts.55
The court in Bower v. Bournay-Bower explored the scope of
authority vested in parent coordinators absent a unanimous agreement from
both parties.
While the SJC determined that judicial authority was
unlawful, it failed to consider the well-being of all persons involved in the
issue. It ignored the impact of prolonged litigation, depleting court-strapped
resources, and the well-being of children. Permitting decision-binding
authority for parent coordinators enables the family and probate court
judges from being overcrowded and backlogged, and protects the wellbeing of children by providing immediate resources necessary for efficient
resolutions. The Commonwealth should trust the authority placed in
probate and family judges, when resolving cases involving children.
Moreover, it should adapt to the progressive nature of family and probate
court matters, and permit parent coordinators in order to protect the best
interests of the children.
Kimberly T. Aquino

52 See Lobel v. Lobel, 933 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010 ) (using third-party
suggestions for judge's binding decision allowed).

Judges should be familiar with recognizing

particular circumstances, like chronic disagreement between parties, and help parties get out of
the resounding cycle of litigation. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 8, at 15 (exercising careful
creativity needed when handling highly charged emotions).
53 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 8, at 14-15 (recognizing that judges have familiarity
with parties that come before them).
54 CHERYL L. GARRITY & JEFFREY WOLF, OVERVIEW OF THE PROBATE & FAMILY COURT,

MASS. LEGAL SERVICES, available at

http://www.masslegalservices.org/system/files/library/Chapter+02+revised+20071025.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 17, 2016) (explaining how to conduct ADR conferences). Unless there is a final
judgment, a new court date is assigned more often than not with the same judge presiding over
the case, which allows the judge and parties to develop an ongoing familiarity with each other.
Standing Order 1-06, supra note 34, at 7 (2006).
55 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing overburdened court systems
prolonging resolution in child custody related cases).

